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Abstract
We incorporate domestic lobbying activities into a policymaker’s decision mak-
ing on whether or not to sign a cooperative bilateral environmental agreement and,
if not, how much pollution a country emits. There are environmental and industrial
lobbyists who attempt to sway the policymaker’s decision toward their respectively
favored policies. As is usually the case with a common agency model, they present
contribution schedules that are tied to resulting policy choices. We focus on the
impacts of the timing of lobbying activities. The first type of lobbying occurs on
the signing of a cooperative agreement, and the second when each nation chooses
its own emission level after the agreement is not signed or one of the signatories
reneges on its promise. We compare the outcomes of the four different cases: (i) no
lobbying activity; (ii) lobbying conducted at the agreement signing stage; (iii) lob-
bying conducted when non-cooperative choice is made; and (iv) lobbying at every
occasion. Our results suggest that the timing of lobbying has a critical impact on
the signing of a cooperative agreement, and that the lobbying activities can pose
a hindrance to the signing of an agreement even when environmental interests are
represented by lobby groups in a similarly high proportion as industrial ones.
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1 Introduction
It is widely considered that international cooperation is crucial in addressing certain
environmental issues, such as global warming and transnational acid rain pollution. Sev-
eral theoretical studies, however, identify the existence of strong free-riding incentive for
sovereign nations in maintaining broad cooperation to tackle with international issues
(e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994). The crux of the problem is typically
illustrated by a Prisoners’ Dilemma-type situation. In a simple two country case, non-
cooperation is the outcome supported by the strictly dominant strategy and, therefore,
a rational sovereign nation would never cooperate in a one-shot game.
Although in a slightly different context of domestic voluntary environmental agree-
ments among profit-maximizing firms, Dowson and Segerson (2008) argue that, if a player
anticipates that the other player will not cooperate once the player himself chooses not
to cooperate in the first place, it will be the weakly dominant strategy for each player to
stick to the cooperative behavior even in a two-person Prisoners’ Dilemma game. They
claim that, since the two players both end up losing in the non-cooperative outcome,
compared to the cooperative outcome, full cooperation is actually self-enforcing even in
a one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma.1 In our context of a bilateral international environmen-
tal agreement, if a nation can immediately detect the other nation’s defection from a
cooperative agreement and, furthermore, costlessly retract its cooperative promise under
such a circumstance, the actual strategic relationship is no longer a Prisoners’ Dilemma,
but should be perceived as a type of coordination game with full cooperation being the
weakly dominant solution, hence a Nash equilibrium in this converted game.2
In a highly politicized international issue, such as global warming, it would be more
plausible that a defection of one country from a cooperative agreement should induce
greater reactions by the other nations. It seems often the case that a defection of a
major country from a cooperative agreement makes the agreement quite ineffectual by
1This is typically referred to as the “stability” argument in the Industrial Organization literature
(d’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz and Waymark, 1983) and later on some works of international
environmental agreements (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis,
2006; Benchekroun and Chaudhuri, 2015).
2We will see this in detail in 3.1.
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inducing relatively inept pollution control efforts by the remaining countries if not further
defections. For instance, the defection of the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol made the
efforts of the remaining nations, most notably, the EU and Japan, less committed and
also less stringent.3 More recently, the defection of the U.S. from the Paris Accord has
created significant uncertainty on the efforts of the remaining signatories .
From a different viewpoint, the collapse of an agreement in the cases where only a
limited number of nations do not adhere to the terms of the agreement can be considered
as the working of a so-called minimum-participation rule (MPR) included in the treaty. A
common type of MPR requires that a minimum number of countries ratify the agreement
before it becomes effective, as is incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol (Altamirano-Cabrera,
Wangler, Weikard and Kroll, 2013), and the MPR in our two-country model is equivalent
to the full cooperation between the two nations. In the same way to the argument above,
the introduction of an MPR transforms a social dilemma game into a coordination game
where cooperation constitutes the dominant strategy solution.
Provided that such a reasoning is legitimate, an immediate question would be why
we still find it difficult for nations to cooperate in an international environmental issue
and even witness a defection of a major nation from a politically highlighted agreement,
such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Accord? To answer this question, we include
the effects of lobbying in the picture. Lobbying is almost universally a legal activity
in modern democracies and is considered to be a means for a policymaker to gather
information on the preference of the general public. On the other hand, lobbying can
provide an opportunity for only politically motivated and often privileged citizens to sway
policymaker’s decision-makings toward their own political interests.
Recently, it has also been suggested in the environmental economics literature that
lobbying activities have significant impacts on the formation of international environ-
mental agreements and also on the national environmental policy (Habra and Winkler,
2012, Hagen, Altamirano-Cabrera and Weikard, 2016, and Marchiori, Dietz and Tavoni,
2017). These studies portray strategic interactions featuring domestic lobbying activi-
ties as a “common agency” game between multiple lobbyists as principals and a single
3There are several proposed rationales that this is the case (see, for instance, Buchner, Carraro, and
Cercosimo, 2002, and Bo¨hringer and Vogt, 2004).
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policymaker as an agent, which has been popularized mainly in the international trade
and public economics arenas by Grossman and Helpman (1994 and 2001), following the
seminal work of Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
In this paper, we derive a political equilibrium of the same spirit among a policy-
maker and environmental and industrial interest groups, and, based on this outcome,
examine whether a cooperative international agreement can be signed and sustained by
the policymakers of the two nations or not. In particular, we consider two different
types of lobbying, depending on its timing. The first type of lobbying takes place at
the occasion of signing the cooperative agreement, and the second takes place when each
nation chooses its own emission level in the cases where the agreement is not signed or
if the other country subsequently reneges on its cooperative promise. The framework
where these two stage games are played sequentially at the international level is similar
to Hagen et al. (2016) and Marchiori et al. (2017), but they do not consider a situation
where lobbying activities take place at the both stages, and, more significantly, do not
explore the differences in the effects of the lobbying activities at these two stages and the
consequences of their interplay.
Our analytical result indicates that, depending on the timing of lobbying activities,
they have quite different implications with respect to their impacts on the resulting equi-
librium outcomes. Specifically, the lobbying activities at the non-cooperative emission
choice stage has a more profound detrimental effect than the lobbying activities at the
agreement-signing stage in terms of posing an obstacle to a successful cooperative agree-
ment. Furthermore, when the lobbying activities are present at the non-cooperative stage,
the lobbying at the signing stage significantly exacerbates the situation in terms of rais-
ing the likelihood of the concerned nations’ failing to take cooperative actions against an
international environmental problem. We also illustrate that introducing asymmetry in
the lobby organization rates has very different implications, depending on the timing of
lobbying activities.
In section 2, we set up a non-cooperative game theoretical model of a bilateral inter-
national environmental agreement which incorporates lobbying competitions within each
country. In the ensuing section, we analyze the equilibrium outcome of the model, partic-
ularly focusing on the timing of possible lobbying activities, and discuss the implications
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of the results. In section 4, we discuss the implications of introducing asymmetries among
nations and lobbyists. The final section concludes the paper.
.
2 The Model
In this section, we set up an analytical model with two symmetric countries, i and j.
In each country, there is a national government which is assumed to be represented by
a single policymaker. The policymaker is typically considered as a ruling party of the
nation, and the policymaker is concerned with the social welfare of the general public
of that country partly because it would affect the prospect of his or her re-election. For
simplicity, we suppose that the policymakers make their decisions concerning a particular
international environmental issue we are focusing on, independently of the other political
agendas.
In each country, there exist producers and consumers of goods which emit this partic-
ular pollutant in their production and/or consumption, and they respectively derive the
benefits of the pollutant emissions in a country i, denoted by ei, during their production
and consumption processes in terms of cost savings, for example. We write the benefit
of the pollutant emission, in the aggregate, as Bi(ei) for country i. As for a type of the
pollution issue, we consider a case of global pollution, and suppose that the magnitude
of environmental damages in country i from this pollution problem is determined simply
by the sum of the amounts of the pollutant emitted by the two countries, i.e., ei+ ej. We
denote the damage cost of country i by Di(ei, ej). Thus, the social welfare of the citizens
in country i, Wi(ei, ej), is given by
Wi(ei, ej) = Bi(ei)−Di(ei, ej). (1)
Following the standard assumption in the literature (c.f., Hagen et al., 2016, and Mar-
chiori et al., 2017), we suppose that the benefit function is quadratic in ei as follows:
Bi(ei) = αei − 1
2
· βe2i , (2)
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where α and β are both positive parameters. On the other hand, the damage cost of
country i is assumed to be linear in the total pollutant emissions of the two counties,
ei + ej:
Di(ei, ej) = δ(ei + ej), (3)
where δ(> 0) is the constant marginal damage cost of the pollutant. Admittedly, this
assumption is rather restrictive in that it causes the marginal damage cost to be indepen-
dent of the emission levels of both countries i and j, which significantly reduces the depth
of strategic interactions between the two nations. Nonetheless, we suppose this particular
functional form as it makes our results comparable to the ones in the literature and, more
importantly, renders the following analysis tractable by allowing us to focus on the effects
of lobbying activities. We also assume throughout this paper that the parameters, α, β
and δ, are symmetric across the countries. Thus, except for certain political parameters,
these two countries share the same environmental and economic characteristics.
Let us first consider the case where the policymaker of each country maximizes its
domestic social welfare defined in (1) by choosing its own emission level, ei, by taking
the other country’s emission level, ej, as given. Such a non-cooperative emission level,
eNi , can be easily obtained as
eNi =
α− δ
β
. (4)
If the two countries can cooperate and coordinate their respective emission levels so
that the joint social welfare of the two symmetric counties is maximized, such a cooper-
ative emission level, eCi (= e
C
j ), is given by
eCi =
α− 2δ
β
. (5)
Starting from the next section where we consider the possibility of implementing a co-
operative agreement between the nations, we consider that eCi is the level of abatement
required in the agreement. This assumption reflects a possible scenario that, upon sign-
ing an international agreement, the participating countries will face emission quotas pro-
posed by an international scientific body, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) for the global warming problem.
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The setups of the underlying environmental and economic situations up to this point
render the agreement-signing choices by the policymakers of the two nations a standard
Prisoners’ Dilemma if the signing decision is irreversible and no country can renege on
its cooperative promise later on. As we discussed in Introduction, however, we consider
that it is quite possible for a country to renege on its original cooperative promise in
international environmental issues, as was exemplified in the case of climate change ne-
gotiations, and also that it is plausible that a country’s defection from the cooperation is
immediately detected by the other country and leads to a weakening of the efforts made
by the other country, and even to a collapse of the entire agreement. This consideration
essentially transforms a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation into a type of a coordination game
in the absence of other elements such as domestic lobbying activities, as we will see in
the next section.
Now, we introduce lobbyists in respective countries into the model. In each nation, we
suppose that there exist one industrial (indexed by P ) and one environmental (G) lobbies
which are both concerned only with their own welfare.4 The payoff of the industrial lobby
in country i excluding the potential lobby contributions, UPi (ei), is given by
UPi (ei) = ω
P
i Bi(ei), (6)
where ωPi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the organizational ratio of the industrial lobby and indicates
how much of the benefit from emitting the pollutant is represented by this lobbyist in
country i.5 In an extreme case, if ωPi = 1, the benefit of pollution that could fall on both
producers and consumers of the associated products is fully reflected in the lobbying
activities of the industrial lobbyist.
Since we suppose that the environmental lobby is concerned primarily with the sta-
tus of the environment and not particularly with the source of the pollution, its payoff
excluding the potential lobby contributions, UGi (ei, ej), depends not only on the emission
4In fact, the setup is easily extended to a case of multiple lobbies which represent an industrial or
environmental interest or to a case where some lobbies represent both industrial and environmental
interests simultaneously.
5Thus, the industrial lobby can include not only the producers of the pollution emitting products but
also their consumers.
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level of country i but also on the emission level of the other country and is written as
UGi (ei, ej) = −ωGi Di(ei, ej), (7)
where ωGi ∈ [0, 1] is the organizational ratio of the environmental lobby. For the time
being, we suppose ωGi = ω
P
i as a benchmark case, and write ω
G
i = ω
P
i = ωi ∈ [0, 1]. Thus,
the value of ωi indicate how significantly citizens of country i is generally involved in this
policy-making process through their lobbying activities.
In the presence of lobbying contributions, the payoffs of the policymaker is given by
the weighted sum of the social welfare of its own citizens, given by Wi(ei, ej), and the
amount of contributions provided by the lobbyists. We suppose that the parameter,
θi ∈ [0, 12 ], is the weight attached to the social welfare, net of the contributions by the
lobbies, and (1− θi) is the weight attached to the contribution amounts in the mind of
the policymaker.6 Our setup indicates that a decrease in θi represents an increase in the
susceptibleness of country i’s policymaker to lobby contributions.
Let us suppose that the policymaker obtains the total contribution amount of c from
the lobbyists. Noting that the contributions by the domestic lobbyists imply a decrease
in the net welfare of the citizens by the same amount, the policymaker’s payoff function
can be written as
θi {Wi(ei, ej)− c}+ (1− θi) c = θiW (ei, ej) + (1− 2θi) c. (8)
As for strategic interactions between the two national policymakers, we consider a
two-stage dynamic game, following Habra and Winkler (2012), Hagen et al. (2016),
and Marchiori et al. (2017). In the first stage, the policymakers of the two countries
respectively choose whether to sign a cooperative international agreement or not. Only
when both countries’ policymakers choose to sign the agreement and stick to its terms, the
cooperative treaty is officially implemented. In the event that the cooperative agreement
was not signed by the two countries or when one of the countries has reneged on its
6We suppose that the maximum possible value of the parameter θi is
1
2 since, if θi exceeds
1
2 , the
policymaker values the welfare of the citizens higher than the lobby contributions, and so never accepts
any contributions from lobby groups.
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promised emission level, the game proceeds to the subsequent stage where the policymaker
of each nation decides on its own emission level independently of the other nation.
Concerning the lobbying activities, we suppose two different possible occasions when
the lobbyists propose their contribution schedules which directly depend on the actions
taken by the policymaker of its own country. The first type of lobbying can take place at
the timing of a policymaker’s deciding on whether to sign an international cooperative
agreement or not, and the second takes place when each nation chooses its own emission
level if the agreement is not signed or if the other country reneges on its promise. We
refer to the first possible lobbying occasion as the “signing stage” and the second as the
“non-cooperative stage.” In the next section, focusing on the case of two countries with
identical characteristics, we identify the equilibrium outcomes of different institutional
settings which are defined by the four cases depending on whether lobbying activities
occur or not at the signing and/or at the non-cooperative stages.
3 Analysis of the Political Equilibrium
Let us suppose for the time being that the two countries are exactly symmetric including
the two political parameters, namely, ωi = ωj ∈ [0, 1] and θi = θj ∈ [0, 12 ]. In section 4,
we discuss the alterations of these symmetry assumptions.
3.1 Benchmark Case: No Lobbying
If there is no lobbying activity at both the signing and non-cooperative stages, the payoff
matrix for the policymaker of country i at the signing stage looks as follows:
Country j
Country i
Sign Not Sign
Sign Wi(e
C
i , e
C
j ) Wi(e
N
i , e
N
j )
Not Sign Wi(e
N
i , e
N
j ) Wi(e
N
i , e
N
j )
Figure 1: The policymaker’s payoffs without any lobbying activities
Here, the respective payoffs are computed by inserting (4) and (5) into (1) under (2)
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and (3):
Wi(e
N
i , e
N
j ) =
(α− δ) (α− 3δ)
2β
, (9)
and
Wi(e
C
i , e
C
j ) =
(α− 2δ) 2
2β
. (10)
In deriving the outcomes in Figure 1, we have supposed that the cooperation entails
the achievement of the joint welfare maximization and also that a country can imme-
diately detect a defection by the other country and, if it wishes, can costlessly switch
its choice of emissions (similarly to d’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz and Waymark,
1983). Since Wi(e
C
i , e
C
j )−Wj(eNi , eNj ) = δ
2
2β
> 0, “Sign” is, indeed, the weakly dominant
strategy for country j at the signing stage. The same is true for country j as well. Hence,
the game is essentially a coordination game, and the most plausible equilibrium outcome
in this game is for both countries to sign the cooperative agreement, and cooperation will
be sustained if each nation recognizes that one’s defection would lead to an immediate
collapse of the agreement.7 It should be noted that this result holds, irrespective of the
values of the environmental parameters, α, β and δ.
3.2 Lobbying Only at the Signing Stage
Now we introduce the lobbying activities only at the agreement-signing stage. Within
this stage, lobbyists and the policymaker play a sequential game where the respective
lobbyists offer to the policymaker fully-committed contribution schedules, which depend
on the subsequent policy decision made by the policymaker, and then the policymaker
chooses whether or not to join the cooperative international environmental agreement.
As for the payoffs, the industrial lobby always prefers the non-cooperative outcome to
the cooperative outcome, and, therefore, has an incentive to promise some contributions
to the policymaker only when he/she does not sign up for the cooperative agreement.
Let us suppose that the industrial lobby provides the policymaker with the contribution
amount of Ni only for the choice of “Not Sign”. In such a case, the lobbyist’s payoff
7Following the convention, throughout the paper, we dismiss Nash equilibria which are only attainable
by weakly dominated strategies of the both players.
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becomes
UPi (ei) = ω
P
i Bi(ei)−N i, (11)
whereas, if the policymaker signs the agreement, the industrial lobby’s payoff is given by
(6) since it does not supply any contribution.
On the other hand, the environmental lobby always prefers the cooperative outcome
to the non-cooperative outcome, and is willing to pay some contribution only when the
cooperative agreement is signed by its own government. If the lobby provides the poli-
cymaker with the contribution amount of Si for the choice of “Sign”, the environmental
lobbyist’s payoff is
UGi (ei, ej) = −ωGi Di(ei, ej)− Si, (12)
and, if the policymaker does not sign the agreement or reneges on its promise to cooperate
before the other nation does, the environmental lobby’s payoff is given by (7).
Here, we assume that the provision of the contributions by the lobbyists at the signing
stage depends solely on the behavior of its own policymaker, and not the actual emission
level that the country undertakes eventually. Especially, when country i has signed the
cooperative agreement but it subsequently implements the non-cooperative action due
to the other country’s non-signing or defection from the agreement, the environmental
lobby still provides the policymaker of country i with a promised contribution amount of
Si.
8
As we defined in the previous section, the payoff of the policymaker is given by (8) in
the presence of the contribution amount of c. Here, c is one of Ni and Si, depending on
the policymaker’s actual decision. Then, the payoff matrix for the policymaker of country
i at the signing stage looks as follows:
8The alternative assumption, i.e., even if we suppose that the environmental lobby withholds the
contribution in the case of non-cooperation initiated by the other country, is also plausible, but does not
make a significant difference to the implications derived from the equilibrium outcomes.
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Country j
Country i
Sign Not Sign
Sign θiWi(e
C
i , e
C
j ) + (1− 2θi)Si θiWi(eNi , eNj ) + (1− 2θi)Si
Not Sign θiWi(e
N
i , e
N
j ) + (1− 2θi)Ni θiWi(eNi , eNj ) + (1− 2θi)Ni
Figure 2: The policymaker’s payoffs with lobbying activities only at the signing stage
In order to derive the equilibrium outcome of this signing stage, we first identify
the maximum amounts of respective lobbyists’ contributions that are contingent on the
choice made by the policymaker of each country. Let us define N¯i to be the industrial
lobby’s maximum willingness to pay to get its policymaker not to sign the cooperative
agreement. The value of N¯i is given by the difference between the lobbyist’s payoff
under the non-cooperative regime and its payoff under the cooperative agreement, i.e.,
ωPi Bi(e
N
i )− ωPi Bi(eCi ). Here, we obtain
N¯i = ω
P
i ·
3δ2
2β
. (13)
Let us also define S¯i to be the environmental lobby’s maximum willingness to pay to
get the policymaker to sign the cooperative agreement. As opposed to N¯i, S¯i is given
by the difference between the lobbyist’s payoff under the cooperative agreement and its
payoff under the non-cooperative regime, i.e., ωGi Di(e
N
i , e
N
j ) − ωGi Di(eCi , eCj ).9 Then, we
obtain
S¯i = ω
G
i ·
δ2
β
. (14)
Thus, under the symmetric assumption that ωPi = ω
G
i = ωi, we have
N¯i − S¯i = ωi · δ
2
2β
> 0, (15)
which implies that the industrial lobby always has a higher maximum willingness to pay
for the lobby contribution at the signing stage than the environmental lobby does.
However, if the following inequality holds, even the maximum contribution amount
provided by the industrial lobbyist, N¯i, can be successfully offset by the environmental
9Here, we consider that the two countries are completely symmetric and thus, eNi = e
N
j and e
C
i = e
C
j .
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lobby’s offer:
θiWi(e
C
i , e
C
j ) + (1− 2θi) S¯i ≥ θiWi(eNi , eNj ) + (1− 2θi) N¯i. (16)
After some simple algebra, we can show that this condition is equivalent to
(1− 2θi) · ωi − θi ≤ 0. (17)
The above inequality implies that, for the values of ωi ∈ [0, 1] and θi ∈ [0, 12 ] that
satisfy (17), any Ni(≤ N¯i) chosen by the industrial lobby will be successfully offset by
some Si(≤ S¯i), inducing the policymaker to sign the agreement. To be more exact, when
(17) holds, the actual outcome of the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the
signing stage is given by the promised contribution amounts of ωi · 3δ22β and 3ωi(1−2θi)−θi1−2θi · δ
2
2β
by the industrial and environmental lobbies, respectively, and the policymaker’s signing
the cooperative agreement.
On the other hand, if (1− 2θi) ·ωi−θi ≥ 0, “Not Sign” by the policymaker is a part of
the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome, with the promised contribution
amounts of θi
1−2θi · δ
2
2β
+ ωi · δ2β and ωi · δ
2
β
by the industrial and environmental lobbies,
respectively. The combinations of ωi and θi which lead to the collapse of the cooperative
agreement are graphically illustrated by the shaded region in Figure 3.
0 wi
θi
1
1
2
1
3
Figure 3: The region where the cooperative deal fails with lobbying at the signing stage
Figure 3 suggests that not just the preference of the policymaker towards the lobby
contributions, represented by θi, but also the degree of political involvement of the citizens
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through lobbying activities, represented by ωi, has an important impact on the success
of a cooperative environmental agreement. Especially, a very significant level of political
organization of the citizens can hinder such an agreement from getting signed if the
policymaker values the lobby contributions relatively highly. From (17), we can derive
the following:
Proposition 1. The larger the degree of the lobby organization, ωi, is, the smaller the
probability of an international agreement getting signed is.
As we can see from (15) that an increase in ωi widens the gap between N¯i and S¯i, which
expands the cases where the industrial lobby can overturn the welfare consideration of the
policymaker especially when the policymaker values the lobby contribution fairly highly.
This observation also applies to the next two cases below.
On the other hand, as long as the value of θi is sufficiently high, i.e., when the
contribution is given a low weight in the payoff of the policymaker, the cooperation
between the countries are likely to be achieved. Specifically, if the value of θi is above
1
3
, i.e., the welfare of the citizens is given at least half as high a weight as the lobby
contributions are by the policymaker, the cooperative agreement will always be signed
and sustained no matter how high the value of ωi might be.
3.3 Lobbying Only at the Non-cooperative Stage
If a cooperative agreement is rejected or reneged by one of the two countries afterward, the
game enters the “non-cooperative” stage, where the policymaker of each nation choose
its own emission level independently of the other country. In order to obtain a sharp
prediction on the outcome of this stage game, we focus on a so-called compensating equi-
librium,10 as is also the case with previous studies (Habra and Winkler, 2012, Hagen et
10This equilibrium concept was originally called a truthful equilibrium, following the seminal work
of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), and used widely under its original name (Grossman and Helpman,
1994). The term “compensating” reflects the relationship between the contribution level and the economic
concept of Hicksian compensating variation. Grossman and Helpman (2001) provide some rationales in
focusing on the compensating equilibrium in a more general setting, such as its characteristics of being
uniquely both Pareto-efficient and coalition-proof.
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al., 2016, and Marchiori et al. 2017). A compensating equilibrium is based on the idea
that, if there were a change in the policy, the change in contribution should compensate a
lobbyist for that change in the policy, so that its payoff remains the same. The derivation
of the compensating equilibrium is detailed in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Gross-
man and Helpman (2001), and we adapt their procedure to the issue of international
environmental pollution.11
Similarly to the agreement-signing stage in the previous subsection, the two lobbyists
and the policymaker play a sequential game within the non-cooperative stage. At the
beginning of the non-cooperative stage, the two lobbies respectively present their own
contribution schedules to the policymaker of their own country. Such schedules are given
by CPi (ei) for the industrial lobby and C
G
i (ei) for the environmental lobby. These contri-
bution schedules are based only on the domestic emission level chosen subsequently by the
policymaker, and their provisions are fully committed by the lobbies. Such contributions
can benefit the policymaker in several ways, including helping him/her to be reelected in
the next election. Thus, the policymaker’s payoff only for the non-cooperative stage with
lobbying, denoted by Zi(ei, ej), is written as
Zi(ei, ej) = θi
(
Bi(ei)−D(ei, ej)− CPi (ei)− CGi (ei)
)
+(1− θi)
(
CPi (ei) + C
G
i (ei)
)
, (18)
where θi is the weight attached to the social welfare, net of the contributions by the
lobbyists, and (1− θi) ∈ [0, 1] is the weight attached to the contribution amounts.
11In fact, political equilibrium concepts used in the two most closely related studies to this paper are
somewhat different from the “compensating” equilibrium defined in Grossman and Helpman (2001).
Hagen et al. (2016) suppose that their industrial lobby’s reservation payoff is given by the payoff
associated with the fully cooperative emission level, arguing that the industrial lobby calculates with
the worst case scenario as a benchmark since it does not know the true emission level in the absence
of its lobby activities. As for the environmental lobby, they suppose the reservation payoff is the one
associated with a business-as-usual scenario, again assuming the worst case possible for this particular
lobbyist. Similarly, Marchiori et al. (2017) consider that the policymaker has the power to extract all the
surplus from the lobbies, arguing that the assumption of such reservation payoffs is natural when there
are two or more lobbies competing domestically with one another. In these two models, consequently, in
order to derive the equilibrium contribution by a certain lobbyist, the lobbyist is made indifferent between
the political equilibrium and the potential case where a policymaker chooses a policy outcome in the
absence of any contribution from this particular lobby alone. However, in a compensating equilibrium
proposed by Grossman and Helpman (2001), it is a policymaker who is made indifferent between the
equilibrium outcome and each case where one of the lobbies is missing from a list of contributors. We
detail their procedure below in order to sort out the differences.
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In the political equilibrium, whose emission levels are denoted by eLi and e
L
j for the
respective nations, the equilibrium outcome must be jointly efficient for the government
and the two lobbies.12 In order to derive such an emission level, let us fix the payoffs of the
lobbies at certain pre-determined levels. In particular, the two lobby groups respectively
achieve the payoffs of UPi (e
L
i ) and U
G
i (e
L
i , e
L
j ) in the political equilibrium. Thus, we use
the following equality as the constraint in the problem to find the jointly efficient emission
level:
CPi (ei) + C
G
i (ei) = ω
P
i Bi(ei)− UPi (eLi )− ωGi Di(ei, eLj )− UGi (eLi , eLj ). (19)
Inserting (19) into (18), the policymaker’s payoff under this constraint becomes
Zi(ei, e
L
j ) =
{
θi + (1− 2θi)ωPi
}
Bi(ei)−
{
θi + (1− 2θi)ωGi
}
Di(ei, e
L
j )
+ (1− 2θi)
(
U(eLi ) + U(e
L
i , e
L
j )
)
.
(20)
The first-order condition for maximizing (20) with respect to ei under (2) and (3) is
{
θi + (1− 2θi)ωGi
}
(α− βei)−
{
θi + (1− 2θi)ωGi
}
δ = 0. (21)
Solving (21) for ei, we obtain the following jointly-efficient level of emissions, e
L
i , which
arises in the political equilibrium of this common agency game under lobbying activities:13
eLi =
α
β
−
{
θi + (1− 2θi)ωGi
}
δ
{θi + (1− 2θi)ωPi } β
. (22)
It can be easily seen that eLi coincides with e
N
i in (4) if industrial and environmental
interests are represented in the exactly same proportion, i.e., ωPi = ω
G
i = ωi.
Now, we identify the contribution amounts, i.e., CPi (e
L
i ) and C
G
i (e
L
i ), in this political
equilibrium of the non-cooperative stage. Since we suppose that the two countries are
completely symmetric concerning the benefits and costs of the pollutant emissions and
also that the marginal damage cost is constant, the resulting equilibrium emission levels
are the same between the two countries, that is, eLi = e
L
j , and furthermore they both
equal to eNi given in (4).
12The proof can be found at pages 268-269 of Grossman and Helpman (2001).
13Throughout the paper, the superscript L indicates the values of variables in the political equilibrium.
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With the lobby contribution, the payoff of the environmental lobby in country i in
this equilibrium of the non-cooperative stage game can be written as
UGi (e
L
i , e
L
j ) = −ωGi Di(eLi , eLj )− CGi (eLi ). (23)
Following Grossman and Helpman (2001), we define the compensating contribution sched-
ule to be the one that coincides with a lobbyist’s indifference curve through the political
equilibrium whenever the contribution amount is positive. The contribution amount is
simply zero elsewhere in the compensating schedule. In particular, the compensating
contribution schedule of the environmental lobby, denoted by HGi (ei), is
HGi (ei) = max
{−ωGi Di(ei, eLj )− UGi (eLi , eLj ), 0} . (24)
On the other hand, the payoff of the industrial lobby in the political equilibrium of the
non-cooperative stage game equals
UPi (e
L
i ) = ω
P
i Bi(e
L
i )− CPi (eLi ). (25)
Similarly to the environmental lobby above, the compensating contribution schedule of
the industrial lobby, HPi (ei), can be defined as
HPi (ei) = max
{
ωPi Bi(ei)− UPi (eLi ), 0
}
. (26)
Given the above information, we can find the policy that the policymaker would
choose in the absence of contribution from the environmental lobby, e−Gi . In this case, the
policymaker would maximize a weighted sum of the net social welfare and the contribution
from the industrial lobby alone.14 This maximization problem leads to
e−Gi =
1
β
(
α− θiδ
θi + (1− 2θi)ωPi
)
. (27)
The relationship between the political equilibrium and e−Gi is graphically illustrated in
14In finding e−Gi , we suppose that the weight attached to the net social welfare is θi while the weight
attached to the contribution from the industrial lobby is 1 − θi, just as in the case of multiple lobbies
above. This applies to the derivation of the contribution of the industrial lobby below as well.
17
Figure 4.
eLi
ei
e−Gi
CGi (e
L
i )
CGi
Zi(e
L
i , e
L
j )
UGi (e
L
i , e
L
j )0
Figure 4: The political equilibrium and the emission level without the environmental
lobby
In Figure 4, we have the level of emission on the horizontal axis and the contribution
by the environmental lobby on the vertical axis. The indifference curves for the policy-
maker and the environmental lobby through the political equilibrium are shown as the
lines indexed by Zi(e
L
i , e
L
j ) and U
G
i (e
L
i , e
L
j ), respectively. The compensating contribution
schedule of the environmental lobby, HGi (ei), is given by the bold line. In particular, the
contribution level of the environmental lobby in the political equilibrium is CGi (e
L
i ).
In such an equilibrium, the environmental lobby must give a sufficient contribu-
tion to ensure that the policymaker chooses eLi , instead of e
−G
i . Denoting the payoff
of the policymaker in the absence of the environmental lobby by Z−Gi (ei, ej), therefore,
Z−Gi (e
−G
i , e
L
j ) = Zi(e
L
i , e
L
j ) must hold. In other words, at the political equilibrium, we
have
θi
(
Bi(e
−G
i )−Di(e−Gi , eLj )
)
+ (1− 2θi)
(
ωPi Bi(e
−G
i )− UPi (eLi )
)
= θi
(
Bi(e
L
i )−Di(eLi , eLj )
)
+ (1− 2θi)
(
CPi (e
L
i ) + C
G
i (e
L
i )
)
,
(28)
which leads to15
(1− 2θi)CGi (eLi ) = θi
(
B(e−Gi )−Bi(eLi )−Di(e−Gi , eLj ) +Di(eLi , eLj )
)
+(1− 2θi)ωPi
(
B(e−Gi )−Bi(eLi )
)
,
(29)
Using the specific benefit and damage cost functions, i.e., (2) and (3), (29) can be written
15Here, we make use of the fact CPi (ei) = ω
P
i Bi(ei)− UPi (eLi ) whenever CPi (ei) > 0.
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as16
(1− 2θi)CGi (eLi ) =(
e−Gi − eLi
) [
α
{
θi + (1− 2θi)ωPi
}− β
2
{
θi + (1− 2θi)ωPi
}
(e−G + eLi )− θiδ
]
,
(30)
where e−Gi is the potentially chosen emission level in the absence of the environmental
lobby and specifically given by (27). From (30), we can obtain
CGi (e
L
i ) =
δ2
2β
· (1− 2θi)ω
P
i
θi + (1− 2θi)ωPi
. (31)
From (31), we can see
∂CGi (e
L
i )
∂ωPi
> 0, which implies that an increase in the organization
ratio of the industrial lobby leads to an increase in the equilibrium contribution amount
by the environmental lobby. When the stake of the other lobby group increases, the
environmental lobbyist needs to exert more efforts to offset the other group’s increased
willingness to pay for the lobby contribution.
We can also find the policy that the policymaker would choose in the absence of
contribution from the industrial lobby, e−Pi . In this case, the policymaker would maximize
a weighted sum of the social welfare and the contribution from the environmental lobby
alone. This maximization problem leads to
e−Pi =
1
β
{
α−
(
1 +
1− 2θi
θi
ωGi
)
δ
}
. (32)
In a similar way to Figure 4, the relationship between the political equilibrium and e−Pi
is depicted in Figure 5.
16We can confirm that the value of CGi (e
L
i ) is strictly positive.
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Figure 5: The political equilibrium and the emission level without the industrial lobby
The indifference curves for the policymaker and the industrial lobby through the
political equilibrium are depicted as Zi(e
L
i , e
L
j ) and U
P
i (e
L), respectively. Also, the com-
pensating contribution of the industrial lobby, HPi (ei), is given by the bold line. The
industrial lobby must give a sufficient contribution, CPi (e
L
i ), to ensure that the policy-
maker chooses eLi , instead of e
−P
i . Denoting the payoff of the policymaker in the absence
of the industrial lobby by Z−Pi (ei, ej), therefore, Z
−P
i (e
−P
i , e
L
j ) = Zi(e
L
i , e
L
j ) must hold,
which is equivalent to
θi
(
Bi(e
−P
i )−Di(e−Pi , eLj )
)
+ (1− 2θi)
(−ωGi Di(e−Pi , eLj )− UGi (eLi , eLj ))
= θi
(
Bi(e
L
i )−Di(eLi , eLj )
)
+ (1− 2θi)
(
CPi (e
L
i ) + C
G
i (e
L
i )
)
,
(33)
which leads to17
(1− 2θi)CPi (eLi ) = θi
(
B(e−Pi )−Bi(eLi )−Di(e−Pi , eLj ) +Di(eLi , eLj )
)
+(1− 2θi)ωGi
(
Di(e
L
i , e
L
j )−Di(e−Pi , eLj )
)
,
(34)
Using the benefit and damage cost functions, i.e., (2) and (3), (34) can be written as18
(1− 2θi)CPi (eLi ) =(
eLi − e−Pi
) [−θiα + θiβ2 (eLi + e−Pi ) + {θi + (1− 2θi)ωGi } δ] , (35)
where e−Pi is the potentially chosen emission level in the absence of the industrial lobby
17Here, we make use of the fact CGi (ei) = −ωGi Di(ei, eLj )− UGi (eLi , eLj ) whenever CGi (ei) > 0.
18We can confirm that the value of CPi (e
L
i ) is indeed strictly positive.
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and specifically given by (32). From (35), we obtain
CPi (e
L
i ) =
1− 2θi
2βθi
(
ωGi δ
)2
. (36)
From (31), we can easily see
∂CPi (e
L
i )
∂ωGi
> 0, as is the case for CGi (e
L
i ) above.
In summary, the political equilibrium under lobbying activities by the two lobbyists
is given by the emission level of (22) and the contribution amounts of (31) and (36). By
substituting (31) and (36) into (18) and considering θi = θj and and ω
P
i = ω
G
i = ωi, the
policymaker’s payoff in the political equilibrium, Zi(e
L
i , e
L
j ), is given as follows:
Zi(e
L
i , e
L
j ) = θi
(α− δ) (α− 3δ)
2β
+(1− 2θi)
{
1− 2θi
2βθi
ω2i δ
2 +
δ2
2β
· (1− 2θi) θωi
θi + (1− 2θi)ωi
}
, (37)
where the first equality reflects the fact that eLi = e
L
j = e
N
i under our assumption in
this section that the political parameters are symmetric across the two countries, i.e.,
ωPi = ω
G
i = ωi and θi = θj.
Given what will subsequently happen in the non-agreement stage, the payoff matrix
for the policymaker of country i at the agreement-signing stage, when there is no lobbying
activity at the signing stage, looks as follows:
Country j
Country i
Sign Not Sign
Sign θiWi(e
C
i , e
C
j ) Zi(e
L
i , e
L
j )
Not Sign Zi(e
L
i , e
L
j ) Zi(e
L
i , e
L
j )
Figure 6: The policymaker’s payoffs with lobbying activities only at the non-cooperative
stage
From (10) and (37), θiWi(e
C
i , e
C
j ) ≥ Zi(eLi , eLj ) if and only if
θi
δ2
2β
≥ (1− 2θi) δ
2
2β
{
1− 2θi
θi
ω2i +
(1− 2θi)ωi
θi + (1− 2θi)ωi
}
, (38)
which can be rewritten as
θ2i {θi + (1− 2θi)ωi} ≥ (1− 2θi)2
[
ω2i {θi + (1− 2θi)ωi}+ ωiθi
]
. (39)
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If the last condition holds, signing the cooperative agreement is still the weakly dominant
strategy for the policymaker of country i. Otherwise, not signing the agreement or
reneging on the agreement becomes the weakly dominant strategy. The combination of
ωi and θi that does not satisfy the condition (39) is graphically shown in Figure 7.
0 wi
θi
1
1
2
1
3
0.75
Figure 7: The region where the cooperative deal fails with lobbying at the non-cooperative
stage
The inequality in (39) is violated when the combination of ωi and θi falls inside the
shaded region in Figure 7. Examining Figure 7, in comparison with Figure 3 in the
previous subsection, we can observe the following:
Proposition 2. Lobbying at the non-cooperative stage has a more significant detrimental
effect than lobbying at the signing stage in terms of potentially becoming a hindrance to
the cooperative agreement.
Especially, when lobbying takes place at the signing stage as we examined in the previous
subsection, lobbying was never a hindrance to successful cooperation at θi =
1
3
, but, when
lobbying occurs at the non-cooperative stage, instead, with ωi ≥ 0.75, the cooperative
agreement cannot be sustained even at θi =
1
3
.
As was mentioned in Introduction, one popular defense of political lobbying activities
is their information transmission role. Without any lobbying activities the policymaker
may find it difficult to gauge Bi(ei) and Di(ei, ej) correctly. This proposition suggests
that, facing such an information acquisition need, if the political system can somehow
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restrict the opportunity of lobbying to one out of the two potential stages which we
consider in this model, the society would be strictly better off by allowing lobbying to
take place only at the signing stage and not at the non-cooperative emission-choice stage.
3.4 Lobbying at Both Stages
Finally, we consider the case where the lobbying activities can take place both at the
signing stage and at the non-cooperative stage once the agreement fails.
What will potentially happen in the non-cooperative stage has already been identified
in the previous subsection, and the contribution amounts in the signing stage do not affect
the lobbyists’ contribution behaviors in the non-cooperative stage since such contributions
are essentially sunk costs for the two lobbyists at the non-cooperative stage. Thus, by
denoting the amount of the lobby contribution provided by the environmental lobby at the
signing stage for signing up for the cooperative agreement as Si and the one provided by
the industrial lobbyist for not signing as Ni, we have the payoff matrix for the policymaker
of country i at the signing stage as follows:
Country j
Country i
Sign Not Sign
Sign θiWi(e
C
i , e
C
j ) + (1− 2θi)Si Zi(eLi , eLj ) + (1− 2θi)Si
Not Sign Zi(e
L
i , e
L
j ) + (1− 2θi)Ni Zi(eLi , eLj ) + (1− 2θi)Ni
Figure 8: The policymaker’s payoffs with lobbying activities both at the signing and
non-cooperative stages
In a similar manner to the case where lobbying activities are possible only at the
signing stage, we can identify respective lobbies’ maximum willingness to pay for the two
contribution amounts, Si and Ni.
Considering the lobbies have to pay contributions at the subsequent non-cooperative
stage as well if the game proceeds to that stage, the industrial lobby’s maximum willing-
ness to pay for Ni, which we denote by N¯i, is now given by N¯i = ωiBi(e
L
i )− ωiBi(eCi )−
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CPi (e
L
i ). Using the specific functional forms in this study, we can obtain
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N¯i =
ωiδ
2
2β
·
(
3− 1− 2θi
θi
ωi
)
. (40)
Clearly, this value is smaller than N¯i of the case where lobbying was not possible at the
non-cooperative stage, which is given by (13). Since the industrial lobby has to contribute
CPi (e
L
i ) at the non-cooperative stage, its benefit of blocking the cooperative agreement
at the signing stage is diminished by that amount.
On the other hand, the environmental lobby’s maximum willingness to pay for Si,
which we again denote by S¯i, is now given by S¯i = −ωiDi(eCi , eCj )−
{−ωiDi(eLi , eLj )− CGi (eLi )} =
−ωiDi(eCi , eCj ) + ωiDi(eLi , eLj ) + CGi (eLi ). Using the specific forms, we can obtain
S¯i =
ωiδ
2
2β
·
(
2 +
1− 2θi
θi + (1− 2θi)ωi
)
. (41)
Comparing this level of S¯i with that of the case where lobbying takes place only at the
signing state, i.e., (14), we can immediately see that the environmental lobby’s willingness
to pay for the lobbying contribution at the signing stage expands as its potential loss of
moving into the non-cooperative stage is inflated because of having to engage in the
lobbying activities at the non-cooperative stage as well. In sum, we have
N¯i − S¯i = ωiδ
2
2β
·
(
1− 1− 2θi
θi
ωi − 1− 2θi
θi + (1− 2θi)ωi
)
, (42)
which could be either positive or negative, depending on the values of the political param-
eters, ωi and θi, in contrast to the result that N¯i− S¯i is always positive in the case where
lobbying takes place only at the signing stage. This observation might give an impression
that the cooperative agreement is more easily attainable when lobbying takes place at
both stages thanks to this diminished gap, if not the reversal of the order, between N¯i
and S¯i. However, it is the policymaker who makes the signing decision at the signing
stage, and we need to compare the payoffs of the policymaker under the two different
decisions at the signing stage.
19Again, we make use of eLi = e
L
j = e
N
i stemmed from the symmetry assumptions, i.e., ω
P
i = ω
G
i = ωi
and θi = θj in this subsection.
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Signing the cooperative agreement is the best response to “Sign” by the other country
at the signing stage when the following condition holds:
θiWi(e
C
i , e
C
j )− Zj(eLi , eLj ) ≥ (1− 2θi)
(
N¯i − S¯i
)
, (43)
Condition (43) can be written as
θi · δ
2
2β
> (1− 2θi) · δ
2
2β
·
{
5ωi +
(1− 2θi)ωi
θi + (1− 2θi)ωi
}
. (44)
Or,
θi {θi + (1− 2θi)ωi} ≥ (1− 2θi) [5ωi {θi + (1− 2θi)}+ (1− 2θi)] . (45)
The above inequality implies that, for the values of ωi ∈ [0, 1] and θi ∈ [0, 12 ] that satisfy
(45), any Ni(≤ N¯i) offered by the industrial lobby will be successfully overwhelmed
by some Si(≤ S¯i) in the equilibrium. Thus, both countries’ signing the cooperative
agreement becomes a part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium when (45) holds. On
the other hand, the combinations of ωi and θi which lead to the collapse of the cooperative
agreement is graphically illustrated by the regions A and B in Figure 9, where the region
B is the one where the cooperation is not sustainable when lobbying takes place only at
the non-cooperative stage.
0 wi
θi
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1
2
1
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Figure 9: The region where the cooperative deal fails with lobbying at the both stages
Therefore, if the combination of ωi and θi falls inside the shaded region B, it is a
case where the cooperative agreement collapses when lobbying occurs at the both stages
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although such an agreement would be sustained if the lobbying activities are constrained
only at the non-cooperative stage. Thus, we can state
Proposition 3. The situation where the cooperative agreement is rejected or not sus-
tained even if it was initially signed, significantly expands if lobbying activities take place
at the signing stage in addition to the non-cooperative stage.
When lobbying activities are already present at the non-cooperative stage, with the addi-
tion of the lobbying opportunity at the agreement-signing stage, the policymaker becomes
significantly more inclined to take the game into the non-cooperative stage. For instance,
when θi =
1
3
, even if lobbying takes place at the non-cooperative stage, the cooperation
can be sustained for any value of ωi ≤ 0.75 as long as lobbying does not occur at the
signing stage. Now, with lobbying both at the signing and non-cooperative stages, the
agreement breaks down if the value of ωi exceeds merely 0.17 for θi =
1
3
.
Combining the Propositions 2 and 3, we can also state the following:
Corollary. When the lobbying activities are already present at the signing stage, the
addition of the lobbying opportunity at the non-cooperative stage raises the policymaker’s
incentive to reject the cooperative agreement.
We have seen above that lobbying opportunity at the non-cooperative stage diminishes
the difference between N¯i and S¯i, if not reverse the order between the two, compared
to the case where such an opportunity is not available for the lobbyists. However, this
corollary implies that this additional occasion for the policymaker to gather lobbying
contributions from the lobbies necessarily renders the policymaker more inclined to reject
the cooperative agreement.
Despite some potential role of lobbying for transmitting information, lobbying activi-
ties provide opportunities for a policymaker to collect contributions. The decisions made
by a self-interested policymaker (even if only partially so) can be distorted more easily as
a number of such occasions increases. Especially, if there are multiple lobbying occasions
as in this case, an institutional reform to cope with such a redundancy might be quite
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beneficial on a social welfare ground.
4 Asymmetric Countries and Asymmetric Organiza-
tions of the Lobbies
In the analysis above, we have supposed that the two countries are exactly symmetric as
regards the two political parameters, ωi = ωj ∈ [0, 1] and θi = θj ∈ [0, 12 ]. In this section,
we first discuss the implications of having different values of these parameters across the
two countries, i.e., ωi ̸= ωj and/or θi ̸= θj.
As we have seen above, the cooperative agreement collapses when the best response
to the other country’s choice of “Sign” turns out to be “Not Sign” for the policymaker
of at least one country. For all the three cases above with lobbying possibilities at
either or both stage(s), such conditions indicate that, when ωi ≥ ωj and θi ≤ θj, i.e.,
the lobbyists are organized more thoroughly and the policymaker is more susceptible to
lobby contributions in country i than in country j, it is country i’s policymaker who is
more likely to opt out of the cooperative agreement. Therefore, we can focus on the
payoff comparison of the policymaker of country i in obtaining the equilibrium outcome
of each case. In other words, if the lobby groups are more organized in a country whose
policymaker is more susceptible, then it is up to the policymaker of this country who
determines the fate of an international cooperative agreement. However, when ωi ≥ ωj
and θi ≥ θj, or when ωi ≤ ωj and θi ≤ θj, the things are not as clear-cut, and which
policymaker is more likely to defect the cooperation depends on the relative magnitudes
of these two political parameters.
Now, we turn to the implications of having different values of the organizational rates
between the two lobby groups within a country. Here, we simply consider the effects of
some deviations of the respective lobby’s organizational rates from the symmetric case,
i.e., ωPi = ω
G
i , which we have examined above. We denote this original value of ω
P
i ( and
ωGi ) by ω
O
i .
First, we look at a relatively straight-forward case where lobbying takes place only at
the signing stage. In this case, the outcome of the non-cooperative stage is not affected
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whatsoever. Suppose that the cooperative agreement has been signed and sustained in
the original symmetric case, ωPi = ω
G
i = ω
O
i , which implies that the initial values of ω
P
i ,
ωGi , and θi are such that the policymaker’s best response to “Sign” by the other country’s
policymaker is “Sign”. Let us now consider that only the value of ωPi increases. With
ωPi > ω
G
i = ω
O
i , then, only the industrial lobby’s maximum willingness to pay for the
contribution is raised according to (13), which leads to a larger gap in N¯i − S¯i. This can
only hurt the success of the cooperation if N¯i − S¯i becomes sufficiently large to overturn
the policymaker’s preference toward the cooperative agreement. So is the case where the
value of ωGi unilaterally gets smaller as can be seen by (14). On the other hand, when the
value of ωPi decreases or when the value of ω
G
i increases, the cooperation will be sustained
just as before.
Second, we turn to a more complicated case where lobbying takes place only at the
non-cooperative stage. From the analysis of 3.3 above, we know that, in the presence
of lobbying, the political equilibrium of the non-cooperative stage is given by (22). It is
obvious from (22) that an increase in ωPi results in a higher e
L
i , which is now different from
eNi since ω
P
i > ω
G
i = ω
O
i . This upward deviation of e
L
i from e
N
i necessarily leads to some
welfare loss as far as the equilibrium outcome of the non-cooperative stage is concerned.
However, as we have seen above in (31) and (36), an increase in the organization rate of
an lobby group always raises the other group’s lobbying contribution amount at the non-
agreement stage.20 Thus, an increase in ωPi leads to a larger contribution amount from the
environmental lobbyist, which is always attractive to the policymaker. Since an increase
in ωPi has these two opposing impacts on the payoff of the policymaker, its effects on the
sustainability of the cooperation is ambiguous and depends on the parameter values.
In contrast, an increase in ωGi has an unambiguous and rather surprising effect on
cooperation as in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. When, at the original symmetric situation, the cooperative agreement
has been signed and sustained, an increase in ωGi may contribute to the failure of the
cooperation. When the cooperative agreement has not been originally sustainable, an
20It should also be noted from (31) and (36) that an increase in the organization rate of a lobby does
not affect its own equilibrium contribution amount at the non-cooperative stage.
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increase in ωGi can never restore the cooperative relationship.
As we can see from (22), an increase in ωGi leads to a lower e
L
i , which is smaller than e
N
i
since ωGi > ω
P
i = ω
O
i now. As long as the size of the increase in ω
G
i is not too significant,
this change will result in some welfare gain at the non-cooperative stage because eLi will be
located between eCi and e
N
i . Moreover, an increase in ω
G
i induces the industrial lobbyist
to contribute more at the non-cooperative stage as is shown by (36). Thus, the payoff
of the policymaker at the non-cooperative stage necessarily improves when the value of
ωGi increases (at least up to a certain extent). This implies that, when the cooperative
agreement has been signed and sustained in the original symmetric case, an increase in ωGi
can only contribute to the failure of the cooperation although the welfare consequence
of the non-cooperation is better than before due to a lower eLi . Moreover, when the
cooperative agreement has not been sustainable at the original case, an increase in ωGi
can never restore the cooperation.
In a similar vein, we can also show that a decrease in ωGi helps the cooperation to be
sustained. In summary, introducing asymmetry in the organization rate has very different
implications, depending on the timing of lobbying activities.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our analytical results indicate that, depending on the timing of lobbying, lobbying activ-
ities have very different implications with respect to their impacts on the resulting equi-
librium outcomes. Especially, if lobbying activities are directed toward the policymaker’s
decision on how much pollutant the country emits when such an agreement collapses,
they have a more significant detrimental influence on the policymaker’s decision making
than they have when the lobbying takes place when the policymaker decides whether or
not to sign the cooperative agreement. Furthermore, when the lobbying activities occur
at the both occasions, the lobbying at the signing stage significantly exacerbates the sit-
uation in terms of raising the likelihood of the concerned nations’ failing to implement a
cooperative solution to an international environmental issue. Lobbying activities provide
opportunities for a policymaker to collect contributions from lobbyists. The decisions
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made by an at least partially self-interested policymaker can be distorted more easily as
the number of such occasions increases.
Provided that there is a role for lobbying activities to supply a policymaker with some
important information on the preference of the citizens, then, the society faces a trade-
off between such a benefit of lobbying activities and its potential societal cost of being
an obstacle to implementing a beneficial environmental treaty on an international scale.
Given the forms of the contribution schedules, the lobbying at the non-cooperative stages
can provide much finer pieces of information concerning the benefits and the damages
of the pollutant emissions for that country. However, lobbying at this stage poses a
more serious challenge in sustaining an international agreement. Lobbying at the non-
cooperative stage also provides rather counter-intuitive results concerning the changes in
the organizational rates of the respective lobbies. Thus, more attentions should be paid
to the workings of lobbying activities especially when such activities are conducted in an
increasingly larger scale.
There are several directions in which this study can be extended. The most immediate
extension would be to examine a stable cooperative coalition in a N -country model as has
been traditionally practiced in this literature (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994;
Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis, 2006; Benchekroun and Chaudhuri, 2015), but now under
the lobbying influences. Indeed, this is a research question that recent studies (Hagen et
al., 2016, and Marchiori et al. 2017) try to address although they use somewhat different
derivation processes for the non-cooperative stage from the one adopted in this study.
It would be interesting to see how the alteration of the derivation process and, more
importantly, the multiple lobbying opportunities that we have proposed in this article
influence the properties of the equilibrium outcomes.
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